Discriminating same from different collections of items is central to human thought and reasoning. Recent comparative research suggests that same-different discrimination behavior: is not uniquely human, does not require human language, is based on the variability of the collection of items, obeys fundamental psychophysical laws, and may be captured by quantitative models of the stimulus collection. The comparative study of same-different discrimination behavior sheds fresh light on the mechanisms and functions of abstract conceptualization. This study also has prompted the development of a theory-the Finding Differences Model-that successfully explains a wealth of findings in the comparative psychology of same-different discrimination behavior.
They say that a picture is worth a thousand words. However, two pictures must surely be worth more than two thousand words because of the numerous relations that can be drawn between them. Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa and James Abbot McNeill Whistler's Mother are both oil paintings of women whose hands are touching one another; however, the two portraits are quite unlike one another in color, style, and the orientation of the subject on the canvas. Pursuing this logic, three pictures must be worth many more than three thousand words because even more relations can be drawn among them. Francisco de Goya's Maja is also an oil painting of a woman whose hands are touching one another. Of the three women, de Goya's Maja is the only nude, Whistler's Mother is the eldest, and Da Vinci's Mona Lisa is the only one outdoors.
Lying at the root of these pictorial relations is "sameness." To say that two or more things are the same as one another requires a comparative judgment. That comparison can be made when all of the stimuli are simultaneously available, as when we are choosing among the several socks in a drawer for the mate that we hold in our hand. Or that comparison can be made when all of the stimuli are successively available, as when we are sorting through a large stack of photographs for the duplicate to the one on the desk.
Detecting sameness between or among stimuli is no arcane or trivial cognitive feat, but one that is absolutely central to psychological science. William James (1890) proposed that the recognition and integration of the "sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking" (p. 459) as well as "the most important of all the features of our mental structure" (p. 460). Beyond the concept of sameness, James further underscored the crucial importance of the complementary sense of differentness and he suggested an interesting and continuing interplay between sameness and differentness: "We go through the world, carrying on the two functions abreast, discovering differences in the like, and likenesses in the different" (p. 529).
Same-Different Conceptualization
There is a rich history to the notions of sameness and differentness. C. Lloyd Morgan (1896) concluded that nonhuman animals cannot learn abstract concepts such as sameness or differentness, a position reiterated a century later by French (1995) . Both authors thus joined the famous 17th century English philosopher John Locke (1690 Locke ( /1975 in believing that the power of Abstracting is not at all in [animals] ; and . . . the having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. (pp. 159 -160) William James (1890) was far more sanguine about the detection of sameness by animals. He suggested that even "creatures extremely low in the intellectual scale [like polyps] may have conception. All that is required is that they should recognize the same experience again" (p. 463).
The comparative significance of same-different conceptualization was more recently discussed by Delius (1994) .
The question whether animals are able to command the abstract twin concept of identity and oddity is among the earliest to be experimentally investigated by comparative psychologists interested in exploring the phylogenetic origins of cognition. That is not surprising, as the capacity of detecting equality or inequality relations among events of variegated nature must be considered an essential prerequisite for several forms of reasoning. (p. 25) Delius proposed a much more stringent way to operationalize same-different conceptualization than James's (1890) surprisingly naïve contentment with mere recognition. According to Delius, it was necessary to demonstrate the operation of a unitary comparison operation issuing a variable signaling either equality or inequality regardless of the particular qualities of the stimuli. These signals in turn should . . . be linkable by suitable instruction or conditioning to any arbitrary pair of responses. (p. 27) Multiple-Item Arrays Wasserman, Hugart, and Kirkpatrick-Steger's (1995) project on same-different discrimination by pigeons closely adhered to Delius's (1994) straightforward methodological desiderata. The data from that experiment provided encouraging evidence that pigeons can learn a general same-different concept that transcends the particular stimuli shown in training.
Specifically, Wasserman et al. (1995) first taught pigeons to peck one report button when they viewed a 4 ϫ 4 array that comprised 16 copies of the same computer icon and to peck a second report button when they viewed a 4 ϫ 4 array that comprised 16 distinctly different computer icons (see the top two rows of Figure 1 ). They created these same and different training displays from one set of 16 computer icons. They later tested the birds with 16 new same displays and 16 new different displays that they created from a second set of 16 computer icons (see the bottom two rows of Figure 1 ). Accuracy to the training stimuli averaged 83% correct (on differentially reinforced training trials) and accuracy to the testing stimuli averaged 71% correct (on nondifferentially reinforced testing trials), in each case reliably exceeding the chance score of 50% correct. Accuracy to the training stimuli did nonetheless reliably exceed accuracy to the testing stimuli.
These data appear to document that pigeons can learn a general same-different concept. Nevertheless, some authors have objected to that interpretation; they have instead suggested that presenting a large number of items introduces the possible participation of "global perceptual features" (Katz et al., 2007, p. 83 ) such as "regular texture" (Mackintosh, 2000, p. 132) or "linear orderliness" (Mandler, 2004, p. 139) . To be sure, the tidiness of the rows and columns in the same displays exceeds that in the different displays (see Figure 1) . Indeed, many observers have informally noted that when the icon arrays are viewed from afar, sameness and differentness can still be discriminated, although the identities of the individual icons cannot. Perhaps the pigeons had not learned a generalizable same-different concept, but a generalizable orderdisorder rule that may be based on the textural or low spatial frequency properties of the visual arrays.
One argument that might be advanced against this orderliness interpretation is that the pigeons discriminated the new testing displays reliably less accurately than they discriminated the old training displays. The birds must have memorized and recognized some or all of the individual icons in the training displays or they could not have shown this generalization decrement to the testing displays. Given the keen visual acuity that is necessary for the birds to achieve individual icon recognition (presumably in the Figure 1 . Examples of some of the 4 ϫ 4 training (top two rows) and testing (bottom two rows) arrays used by Wasserman, Hugart, and Kirkpatrick-Steger (1995) . From "Pigeons Show Same-Different Conceptualization After Training With Complex Visual Stimuli," by E. A. Wasserman, J. A. Hugart, and K. Kirkpatrick-Steger, 1995, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 28, p. 249 . Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
near frontal field and requiring the resolution of high spatial frequencies), is it plausible for the birds simultaneously to detect general spatial orderliness (presumably at a greater distance from the viewing screen and requiring the discrimination of low spatial frequencies)?
Orderliness?
Putting aside arguments over interpretive plausibility, several follow-up experiments were conducted to empirically address the possible role of spatial orderliness in the pigeon's same-different discrimination behavior. began with an experiment entailing a new stimulus presentation procedure. Rather than placing the 16 icons of the same and different displays into a completely filled 4 ϫ 4 grid (see Figure 1) , we (Experiment 1) placed the 16 icons into an incompletely filled 5 ϫ 5 grid (see Figure 2) ; now, both the same displays and the different displays were disorderly, although some vertical and horizontal linearities could occur. Should the pigeons again learn and generalize this visual discrimination with these spatially disordered displays, the case for orderliness discrimination would be weakened.
A further feature of the first experiment that may have affected the pigeons' learning and transfer performance was the use of only 32 arrays: 16 same displays and 16 different displays in each of the training and testing sets. With this procedure, Wasserman et al. (1995) might have created relatively unfavorable conditions for the birds' to acquire a general same-different concept. Specifically, the daily training sessions entailed five repetitions each of the 32 training stimuli. Repetition of a finite number of training stimuli can weaken pigeons' basic-level concept learning (Wasserman & Bhatt, 1992) . Therefore Experiment 1 of was designed to virtually eliminate the repetition of individual displays by randomly distributing the 16 icons to 25 possible locations. Now, the odds of any given display ever being repeated for a single bird either within or between sessions were vanishingly slim. Pigeons were later transferred to arrays of novel icons to test the generality of their discrimination behavior.
Acquisition of discriminative responding was quite rapid and there was strong transfer to novel 16-item displays. Discriminative performance to displays created from the training icons averaged 93% correct and discriminative performance to displays created from the untrained testing icons averaged 79% correct. Again, accuracy was reliably higher than chance to both the training displays and to the testing displays; and, again, accuracy was reliably higher to the training displays than to the testing displays. We were pleased that Wasserman et al.'s (1995) original results were replicable; and we were heartened that the results of this second experiment were less likely to represent an orderliness discrimination because of the spatial disorder of both same displays and different displays.
Yet, because we had not entirely eliminated all vertical and horizontal alignments in our previous experiment, we next adopted a different tactic for item placement to investigate the possible role of spatial orderliness in discriminative performance. In the first of a pair of experiments, we (Young & Wasserman, 2001b , Experiment 1) initially trained pigeons with orderly displays similar to those shown in Figure l and we later tested the birds with disorderly displays similar to those shown in Figure 3 , where a "staggering" algorithm eliminated all vertical and horizontal linearities-on both same trials and different trials. Performance averaged 91% correct across all trials, with accuracy on disorderly testing trials slightly exceeding accuracy on orderly training trials. In the second of the pair of experiments, Wasserman, Frank, and Young (2002, Experiment 1) trained other pigeons from the outset on a same-different discrimination using displays similar to those depicted in Figure 3 . Although vertical and horizontal regularities were eliminated, the pigeons' learning of the same-different discrimination was not; pigeons very ably came to discriminate same from different arrays of icons. Thus, spatial orderliness appears to be unnecessary for our pigeons' same-different discrimination behavior.
We nevertheless wished to give the orderliness interpretation every possible chance to prevail. So, a second pair of experiments adopted a different approach. In the first experiment, we (Young & Wasserman, 2001b, Experiment 2b) tested pigeons with arrays that contained a mixture of planar rotations of 16 icons at 0°, 90°, 180°, and 270°after the birds earlier had been trained to discriminate uniformly oriented same and different arrays (see the sameuniform and different-uniform arrays of Figure 4 for examples). If the four disparate rotations of an icon are nonetheless judged by pigeons to be identical, then same trials should be similarly responded to whether the icons are uniformly or differently oriented; but, if the four disparate rotations of an icon are judged by pigeons to be nonidentical, then the pigeons should behave as if a same array with varied icon rotations is equivalent to an array comprising four copies of four entirely different types of icons (4 -4 -4 -4 displays, see the bottom row of Figure 4 ). Responding to any of the Figure 2 . Examples of some of the 5 ϫ 5 arrays used by in which some locations were left unfilled to create discontinuities. From "Entropy Detection by Pigeons: Response to Mixed Visual Displays After Same-Different Discrimination Training," by M. E. E. A. Wasserman, 1997, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 23, p. 158. Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission. different arrays should be unaffected by the variation in icon rotation because all of the different arrays already comprise 16 different kinds of icons.
Our results revealed that arrays of same visual items were treated equivalently whether those arrays contained uniformly oriented icons or varied planar rotations of the icons at 0°, 90°, 180°, and 270°( Figure 4 , top row; Figure 5 ); strong reports of "same" here were dramatically disparate from strong reports of "different" to the remaining types of displays (Figure 4 , middle and bottom rows; Figure 5 ). Therefore, pigeons not only generalize their same-different discrimination performance to novel visual items (Wasserman et al., 1995; , but they also deem the rotation of the items to be utterly irrelevant to discriminating the sameness or differentness of the items in a display.
In the second experiment, Brooks and Wasserman (2008, Experiment 1) replicated the investigation of Young and Wasserman (2001b, Experiment 2) now using trial-unique grayscale mosaics (see Figure 6 ) instead of frequently repeated icons (see Figure 3) ; those mosaics were spatially staggered within the display area to avoid any vertical and horizontal linearities. All of the birds mastered this same-different discrimination with trial-unique stimuli to 80% correct choice on both same trials and different trials. Acquisition occurred under conditions in which each training trial was also a transfer trial; thus, no recurring perceptual cue or stimulus memory can account for these pigeons' discriminative performance.
The results of the planar rotation test again argued against lower level perceptual accounts of the pigeons' same-different discrim- Figure 3 . Examples of some of the 5 ϫ 5 arrays used in Experiment 1 of Young and Wasserman (2001b) that used staggering to create discontinuities. From "Evidence for a Conceptual Account of Same-Different Discrimination Learning in the Pigeon," by M. E. , Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 8, p. Young and Wasserman (2001b) . From "Evidence for a Conceptual Account of Same-Different Discrimination Learning in the Pigeon," by M. E. , Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 8, p. ination behavior. Here, too, the birds responded to displays in which the same mosaic was rotated in four different orientations as if they were same trials; by contrast, displays comprising four copies of four different mosaics were equally likely to be reported as same or different. These results urge a mosaic-based interpretation, in which pigeons encode each mosaic's pattern or configuration in a rotation-invariant manner (Young & Wasserman, 2001b , Experiment 2); these results further suggest that pigeons can use abstract stimulus relations to solve a same-different discrimination task without the participation of spatial orderliness.
In a final project, Young, Wasserman, and Ellefson (2007) examined the effects of item blurring on pigeons' discriminative behavior to see whether their responding in a same-different task was due to a low spatial frequency discrimination. A low spatial frequency account suggests that the pigeons are actually performing a texture discrimination. If the same-different discrimination is mediated by low spatial frequencies, then blurring the icons should have little or no effect on discriminative responding; blurring degrades the higher spatial frequencies, but it retains the basic texture of these displays.
Each icon in testing was subjected to a Gaussian blur. The original size of each icon "box" was maintained during the blurring process, so that the icons never abutted one another. The blurring levels sampled a broad range of values (see Figure 7) . Because of the large effects of blurring that we observed during the first phase of testing (high range: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0), a second phase of testing was conducted (low range: 0.3, 0.6, 1.0) involving more subtle blurring.
In Phase 1, blurring the icons had a profound effect on the pigeons' discriminating same from different arrays (Figure 8 , filled symbols). Although accuracy to the same and different training arrays was uniformly high (86%), accuracy to the blurred testing arrays was near chance (53%). More important, the effect of blurring was strikingly asymmetrical; the same testing arrays were unaffected by blurring, whereas the different testing arrays were consistently and erroneously classified as same when they were blurred. In Phase 2, the behavioral effects of the lower blurring levels were considerably attenuated (Figure 8 , open symbols). Although accuracy to the same and different training arrays was uniformly high (85%), accuracy to the blurred testing arrays decreased as the blurring level increased. Again, the effect of blurring was decidedly asymmetrical; the same arrays were unaffected by blurring, whereas the different arrays were classified as same when they were blurred. Simply put, when pigeons could not discriminate the icons in a display from one another, they reported same, even if the array actually comprised nonidentical items.
Clearly, each of the many efforts failed to confirm that spatial orderliness participates in pigeons' same-different discrimination. Eliminating spatial orderliness did not eliminate pigeons' learning Brooks and Wasserman (2008) . The background in the original pictures was red. From "Same/Different Discrimination Learning With Trial-Unique Stimuli," by D. I. Brooks and E. A. Wasserman (2008) , Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 15, p. or maintaining the same-different discrimination, whereas eliminating the high spatial frequencies of the displayed items seriously impaired their same-different discrimination.
Beyond these results with simultaneous arrays of visual items, some researchers (Young, Wasserman, & Dalrymple, 1997; Young, Wasserman, Hilfers, & Dalrymple, 1999 ) also have found that successive lists of multiple-visual items effectively support same-different discrimination learning and transfer to novel visual stimuli. Under these successive discrimination conditions, in which only one item at a time is given, spatial orderliness cannot possibly serve as the functional cue for same-different reports (also see Cook, Kelly, & Katz, 2003) .
Variability?
Given the implausibility of general orderliness controlling pigeons' same-different discrimination behavior, we suggested an altogether different way to envision the basic experimental tasks. The same arrays and the different arrays might really represent the two endpoints of a continuum of display variability. The same displays might represent minimal variability, with all 16 icons the same as one another, whereas the different displays might represent maximal variability, with all 16 icons different from one another. In another series of investigations, , Experiments 2, 3, and 4), we began to explore the behavioral effects of intermediate degrees of variability. We devised three distinctively disparate ways of constructing mixture arrays comprising both identical and nonidentical items. These mixture arrays were presented as infrequent probe tests and food reinforcement was given irrespective of the pigeons' report responses. Figure 9 illustrates the given points along the continuum of mixture types for one of the three ways of creating visual display variability.
It was not obvious how the pigeons would respond to these mixture displays. All of the mixtures included more than one kind of icon, perhaps prompting pigeons to make a "different" report response; but, all of the mixture displays also included repetitions of icons, which might prompt pigeons to make a "same" report response. It was also possible that pigeons would show a graded change in responding as the displays progressively changed from being all same to all different, thus evidencing a sensitivity to differing degrees of display variability.
In all three experiments , Experiments 2, 3, and 4), the pigeons exhibited a smooth transition in their same and different responding as the mixture arrays changed from all same to all different. These three experiments thus suggested that the pigeons were discriminating the variability in the stimulus displays even though training was with the endpoints only: same and different. Might there be a principled way to integrate these three data sets? Yes there was. Shannon and Weaver (1949) quantified the amount of variety or diversity in a categorical variable by a weighted average of the number of bits of information that are required to predict each of the categories of the variable. Their equation was:
where H(A) is the entropy of categorical variable A, a is a category of A, and p a is the proportion of observed values within that category.
We applied this entropy equation to our task. When a stimulus display has 16 identical icons, there is only one category with a probability of occurrence of 1.00. Because log 2 (1.00) ϭ 0.00, the entropy for the same displays is 0.00. The different displays have one occurrence of each of 16 icons or categories. The entropy formula gives the value: Ϫ0.0625
‫ء‬ log 2 (.0625) ‫ء‬ 16, or 4.00. During testing, the pigeons could thus have responded to a display based on whether its entropy is closer to 0.00 or to 4.00. Figure 10 shows the best fitting line of the individual birds' data for each of the three experiments. (The line was not fit with the same and different training arrays because their inclusion inappropriately inflates the value of R 2 .) The obtained regression was statistically significant and it accounted for a remarkable 85% of the variance.
Entropy not only accorded with pigeons' discrimination behavior with randomized mixtures of same and different items in this study (Young & Wasserman,1997) , but it also performed well in a follow-up study (Wasserman, Young, & Nolan, 2000) in which the Figure 7 . Examples of some of the blurred icons from the arrays used in used in Young, Wasserman, and Ellefson (2007) . From "A theory of variability discrimination: Finding differences," by M. E. Young, E. A. Wasserman, and M. R. Ellefson (2007) , Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, p. same mixtures of identical and nonidentical items were either locally organized or randomized (see Figure 11 ). The key to success here was to appreciate that the pigeons may have selectively attended to some (approximately 6), but not to all (16) of the items in the displays. This later investigation was originally undertaken to see whether an additional factor-display organization-makes an independent contribution to discrimination behavior. In a purely technical sense it did: when overall entropy was held constant, organized displays prompted more "same" responses than did randomized displays. So, for entropy to effectively encompass this result-albeit with the inclusion of selective spatial attention-is a noteworthy theoretical achievement.
A further noteworthy accomplishment of entropy as a way to quantify the effects of variability on discrimination behavior was established when mixed lists of same and different items were given to pigeons one item at a time (Young et al., 1999) . Once again, entropy nicely accorded with the empirical findings, now with the further factor of memory coming into play: Items toward the end of the list exerted much more control over pigeons' report behavior than did items toward the start of the list.
To summarize the evidence considered so far: Pigeons' simultaneous and successive same-different discrimination behavior is quite robust and it is highly sensitive to the degree of variability in complex visual displays and lists. Our original quest to understand pigeons' discrimination performance on the 16-icon samedifferent procedure prompted us to reevaluate the very nature of this task. Using large numbers of items does appear to make the task more obvious, but in a wholly unexpected manner. Pigeons may not be responding in accord with the human concept of same-different at all. In contrast to a dichotomous same-different Figure 9 . Examples of some of the icon arrays used in Experiment 3 of . The mD/nS notation designates a display including m different icons and n same icons. . From "Entropy Detection by Pigeons: Response to Mixed Visual Displays After Same-Different Discrimination Training," by M. E. concept (Delius, 1994) , pigeons may treat same versus different visual stimuli as lying on the ends of a continuous spectrum of stimulus variability.
Is Only Two True?
In a recent focused review of comparative research into samedifferent discrimination behavior, Katz et al. (2007) contended that work involving multi-item arrays, such as ours, cannot support true same-different concept learning. Central to their contention is that the "interpretation of what the subjects are doing in the task is simplest when there are just two items and the subject judges whether they are same or different" (p. 83). Of course, two items do represent the smallest number possible to support a relational judgment, like same or different. However, simultaneously presenting only two items in vertical or horizontal alignment invites another complicating interpretive factor-symmetry-because two identical items create symmetrical arrays, whereas two nonidentical items create asymmetrical arrays. Rather than debate the logical merits of two-item versus multi-item discriminative stimuli, we next present the results of several experiments systematically exploring whether and how varying the number of items in an array affects pigeons' same-different discrimination behavior.
Our first (Young & Wasserman, 1998) effort to study this variable involved training pigeons that had successfully learned and transferred the same-different discrimination involving displays of 16 icons with displays of 12, 8, 4, and 2 icons (see Figure 12 ) presented randomly in experimental sessions. The result was a dramatic and unexpected failure; the pigeons ceased pecking altogether after only 1 or 2 days of such training. Their cessation of responding was anything but random; the pigeons invariably stopped responding on 2-icon different trials. Prior to this stoppage, the pigeons had repeatedly pecked the "same" report key despite the presentation of 2 different icons.
We had originally chosen 16-icon arrays in an attempt to make the task more obvious to pigeons; that choice was based only on our intuition that more same or different items would increase the salience of the discriminative stimuli. More interesting, our more principled entropy analysis suggests that increasing the number of items in a display may indeed simplify the task for learners by widening the disparities in entropy between same and different displays. As detailed earlier, 16-item same displays have an entropy of 0.00 and 16-item different displays have an entropy of 4.00. In contrast, 2-item same displays also have an entropy of 0.00, but 2-item different displays have an entropy of only 1.00. So, in the 16-item task, pigeons must learn to discriminate between entropies of 0.00 and 4.00 (a disparity in entropy of 4.00), whereas in the 2-item task, pigeons must learn to discriminate between entropies of 0.00 and 1.00 (a disparity in entropy of only 1.00)-the latter presumably being a much more difficult task. In general, same displays always have an entropy of 0.00 regardless of the number of items, whereas different displays rise in entropy as the number of items is increased.
The second experiment was conducted with slightly different procedures to document the effects of the number of items on same-different discrimination behavior. Again (Young, Wasserman, & Garner, 1997 , Experiment 1), pigeons that had previously been trained with 16-item displays were tested with displays involving fewer items; but now, the birds were given nondifferentially reinforced testing displays randomly comprising 2, 4, 8, 12, or 14 items that were either the same as or different from one another (see Figure 12 ). The use of nondifferential reinforcement meant that the extinction of responding that we had earlier observed to 2-item different arrays under differential reinforcement should no longer affect testing performance.
Discrimination of 16-icon same from 16-icon different training arrays in testing sessions averaged 89% correct. Discrimination of same from different 2-, 4-, 8-, 12-, and 14-icon testing arrays averaged 49%, 54%, 73%, 79%, and 83% correct, respectively. Clearly, discrimination performance was adversely affected by reducing the number of depicted icons.
More detailed examination of choice behavior to same arrays and to different arrays disclosed that the decrease in discriminative performance with arrays of fewer items was principally due to an increase in errors to the different arrays (see Figure 13 ). The Figure 11 . Examples of some of the randomized mixtures and locally organized display mixtures used in Wasserman, Young, and Nolan (2000) . probability of choosing "different" did not systematically vary across the six same-trial array numbers. However, the probability of choosing "different" did vary across the six different-trial array numbers; the fewer the icons, the lower the probability of choosing "different." In fact, the pigeons strongly reported "same" to the 2-and 4-icon different displays.
When pigeons are trained to discriminate 16-icon same arrays from 16-icon different arrays, they should have learned to make one response to displays with an entropy of 0.00 and a second response to displays with an entropy of 4.00. During testing, a bird would then be expected to distribute its responses to novel arrays as a function of their entropy; displays with entropies closer to 0.00 should be more likely to be classified as same, whereas those with entropies closer to 4.00 should be more likely to be classified as different. The entropy of a 2-item different display, 1.00, is thus more similar to that of 16-item same displays, 0.00, than it is to that of 16-item different displays, 4.00. This entropy discrimination should therefore prompt classification of 2-item different displays as same rather than different, in accord with our empirical findings. These results thus represent an important and strikingly counterintuitive confirmation of the pigeon's use of entropy in the classification of complex visual displays.
And, what of the contention that only 2-item displays are relevant to true same-different conceptualization? Scrutiny of Figure 13 discloses no profound or categorical break in pigeons' discrimination performance from 2 to 4 items; rather, their behavior is a systematic function of the number of displayed items from 2 to 16 on different trials, but not on same trials.
We suspect that a single root process underlies same-different discrimination behavior regardless of the number of presented items-variability discrimination. Certainly, the two-item same versus two-item different task most severely taxes any organism's discrimination ability. And, pigeons fare very poorly on this task. However, we see no compelling behavioral reason to confer special status to two-item same-different discriminations; the changes in performance across different numbers of items appear to be altogether quantitative and not qualitative.
Consider three final points concerning pigeons' poor samedifferent discrimination performance when only two items are shown. First, their behavior may importantly depend on the particular experimental task that they are given (cf. Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Katz et al., 2007) . With our two-alternative forced-choice task, pigeons perform at chance levels. However, with a go/no go procedure, in which individual birds are given either sameϩ/ Figure 12 . Examples of some of the displays comprising 2, 4, 8, 12, 14, or 16 icons used in Young, Wasserman, and Garner (1997) . (2, 4, 8, 12, 14, or 16 ) and the type of display (same or different) from Experiment 1 of Young, Wasserman, and Garner (1997) . different-training or differentϩ/same-training, Wasserman et al. (2002, Experiment 2) obtained modest, but reliable two-item same-different discrimination behavior. Second, even that modest level of discrimination performance required the progressive reduction in the number of presented icons across a series of extended training periods; training pigeons with two-item displays from the outset failed to support effective discrimination behavior (Frank, Young, & Wasserman, 2003) . Third, even with the possibly more sensitive go/no go task and the progressive reduction in the number of presented icons, the accuracy of pigeons' same-different discrimination behavior was a clear positive function of the number of presented items-again a quantitative effect.
Odd Birds?
Of course, we all know that pigeons have an infamous intellectual reputation (Whitman, 1919) . This reputation no doubt led Mandler (2004) to discount our findings with pigeons because they have "bird brains" (p. 138).
Rather than debating the intellectual prowess of pigeons, we decided to experimentally explore the comparative generality of our results. So, Wasserman, Fagot, and Young (2001, Experiment 1) trained and tested baboons on the same tasks as we gave to pigeons. Baboons mastered the same-different task and transferred the discrimination to novel visual items; they showed graded changes in "same-different" reports in response to changes in the mixture of same and different items , Experiments 2 & 3); they exhibited no decrement in same-different discrimination accuracy when the items were spatially staggered , Experiment 4); but, they showed progressive decrements in same-different discrimination accuracy when the items were systematically blurred , Experiment 5); and, they showed progressive decrements in same-different discrimination accuracy when the number of items was decreased (also see Flemming, Beran, & Washburn, 2007 , for related research with rhesus monkeys; , Experiments 1 & 2), but not increased , Experiment 3) from the training value of 16, thereby controlling for stimulus generalization decrement.
Forget those clichés about bird brains and stupidity! At least on our simultaneous same-different discrimination task, baboons responded in parametric parallel with pigeons.
What About Humans?
"Whatever the pigeons are responding to does not appear to be anything like a human concept of same-different" (Mandler, 2004, p. 140) . Years before Mandler published this contention, we ourselves had wondered whether humans would respond at all like the pigeons and baboons in our same-different discrimination tasks. Specifically, if humans were given mixtures of same and different icons, then we would certainly expect them to respond "different" so long as any of the items differed from one another. As well, varying the number of icons should surely have no effect on humans' discrimination performance; after all, 2 different items are just as different from one another as are 16 different items. However, to put these matters to empirical test, we conducted a project with college students that paralleled the work that we had completed with pigeons and baboons.
Young and Wasserman (2001a, Experiment 1) first taught college students to discriminate same from different arrays of 16 computer icons. We told the students that they would be viewing a series of visual arrays and attempting to learn which response was correct for each. Critically, the words "same" or "different" were never used at any point in the project. Students were simply told to make their best guess as to which of two responses was correct; they were then given feedback in the form of a tone (correct) or a flash of the screen (incorrect). We finally tested the students with displays of intermediate variability as well as with displays comprising fewer than 16 icons.
Individual students' choice responding to the testing arrays that contained fewer than 16 icons or that were mixtures of same and different icons revealed dramatically disparate profiles (Figure 14,  top) . To separate the profiles, we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis of choice responding to the different arrays: 80% of the students fell into one cluster and 20% fell into a second. We used only the different arrays in this cluster analysis to see whether disparities in choice responding to those arrays would predict disparities in choice responding to the mixture arrays; responding to the same arrays was quite similar in both clusters of students.
Figure 14 (top) shows the disparities in choice behavior between the clusters of students. The students in the smaller (continuous) cluster responded in close accord with entropy; they were more likely to choose "same" to the different arrays as the number of icons was reduced, but they consistently chose "same" to the same arrays regardless of the number of icons. The continuous students also exhibited a strong sensitivity to the full range of display variability to the mixture arrays; as the mixture was changed from mostly same to mostly different icons, responding smoothly changed from mostly "same" to mostly "different." So, students in the continuous cluster responded as if display variability fell along a continuous scale-just like our pigeons and baboons. The students in the larger (categorical) cluster behaved quite differently, treating the discrimination more categorically. These categorical students were largely unaffected by the number of icons in the same and different displays, although accuracy did decline slightly on different trials as the number of items was reduced. Plus, when any of the icons were different on mixture trials, categorical students tended to choose "different;" only when all of the icons were identical did they strongly choose "same." None of the individual difference characteristics that we examined (handedness, ACT scores, sex, grade point average, or age) accounted for the disparate behavioral profiles that we observed among the students.
We also examined students' reaction times to the same and different arrays that comprised fewer than 16 icons and to the 16-item mixture arrays (Figure 14, bottom) . With this additional measure of same-different discrimination performance, both clusters of students exhibited measurable sensitivity to entropy! Reaction times grew longer as the number of icons was reduced. As well, reaction times were longer on different trials than on same trials; this disparity grew larger as the number of icons was reduced for both clusters of students, but particularly for the continuous students. Reaction times to the 16-item mixture arrays were much longer than those to the 16-item same and 16-item different training arrays for both clusters of students; the peak of the mixture function was closer to an entropy of 0.00 for the categorical students than for the continuous students.
In the Young and Wasserman (2001a) study, students were always trained with 16-icon arrays. Choice accuracy and reaction time might therefore have been impaired either because of the decrease in the number of icons or because of the change in the number of icons from the training value-a possible case of stimulus generalization decrement. If this generalization decrement interpretation were true, then explicitly training people with 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16 icons from the outset should eliminate any effect of the number of items because all of these quantities would be equally familiar. However, if training with same and different displays of diverse numbers of icons still produced poor performance with displays of smaller numbers of icons, then this result would attest to real discrimination difficulty with small numbers of items.
So, Castro, Young, and Wasserman (2006) pursued humans' discrimination of multiple-item arrays by again training college students to make discriminative report responses to identical and nonidentical arrays. Here, however, the training arrays did not always involve 16 items; instead, the training arrays randomly involved 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16 items.
After students learned the task, Castro et al. (2006) focused on their choice responding to the mixture testing arrays; it was no longer best to divide students' performance to the differentnumber arrays because learning the task with different numbers of items worked against observing robust individual differences. Nonetheless, they again observed two strikingly disparate patterns of discrimination behavior (Figure 15, top right) . As in the previous study (Young & Wasserman, 2001a) , most students (70%) treated the mixture testing displays categorically with the remaining students (30%) responding continuously to visual display variability. Students in the categorical cluster responded "different" when any of the icons in the mixture testing arrays were different; only when all of the icons were identical did they strongly report "same." Categorical students' reaction times were brief with entropy 0.00 (same) arrays; they rose sharply with entropy 0.50 arrays (near which the category boundary between same and different presumably lies); and, they became progressively shorter nearing the opposite categorical endpoint with the entropy 4.00 (different) arrays (Figure 15, bottom right) . Hence, categorical students' reaction times to the mixture testing arrays disclosed that they had the greatest difficulty discriminating displays with entropies near the category boundary. By contrast, continuous students responded as if display variability fell along a continuous dimension: As the mixture testing displays were changed from including mostly same icons to including mostly different icons, these students' responding changed from mostly "same" reports to mostly "different" reports ( Figure 15 , top right). Continuous students' reaction times to these mixture testing arrays rose from entropy 0.00 to entropy 2.00, followed by a slight fall to entropy 4.00, suggesting that the categorical boundary between low and high variability was less distinct in this group and that it was located near entropy 2.00 ( Figure 15, bottom right) .
Categorical students were largely unaffected by the number of icons in the same and different training displays, although they did exhibit a very small decrease in accuracy to the different arrays as the number of items was reduced (Figure 15 , top left). Continuous students showed a larger decrease in accuracy to the different arrays as the number of items was reduced; item number had little effect on their responding to the same arrays (Figure 15, top left) .
Both clusters of students' reaction times were similar for same training arrays with different numbers of icons; reaction times progressively rose with decreases in the number of items (Figure 15, bottom left) . For different training arrays, however, categorical students responded faster than continuous students; this disparity narrowed with decreasing numbers of items (Figure 15 , bottom left).
Thus, in two separate studies, it was discovered that different numbers of icons and different mixtures of same and different icons each reliably influenced college students' same-different discrimination behavior (Figures 14 and 15 ). Both accuracy and reaction time were adversely affected by reducing the number of displayed items, more so on different trials than on same trials. As well, choice behavior and reaction time were systematically affected by the mixture of same and different items. A minority (continuous) of the students showed the most striking effects on both choice behavior and reaction time; but, even the majority (categorical) of the students exhibited measurable sensitivity to different numbers of icons and to different levels of display variability, especially in their reaction time performance. Thus, any complete account of same-different discrimination must consider the behavior of many different species, including humans, as sensitivity to variability is quite widespread.
Only Human?
So, just what is the "human" concept of same-different? The answer to this question appears to depend on whom you ask; college students are far from uniform in their responding on our standard same-different discrimination task. The fact that some humans (and all pigeons and baboons) exhibit a continuous response profile suggests that these people may not deploy language in performing the same-different discrimination. Why? Perhaps having symbols for "same" and "different" transforms a discrimination that is mediated solely by variability into one that is also leveraged by language or by other aspects of human enculturation.
Another possibility is that this dramatic disparity between the dichotomization and the dimensionalization of same and different stimulus arrays is more apparent than real. All organismsincluding humans-may scale the stimuli in terms of variability, but their same-different reports may arise from setting different decision criteria to collections of stimuli lying along this continuum. Organisms that appear to be dichotomizing the collections of stimuli may place their decision criterion very near the low end of the variability continuum, whereas organisms that appear to be dimensionalizing the stimuli may place their decision criterion near the midpoint of the variability continuum (cf. Cook & Wixted, 1997) . This variability criterion analysis stands in stark contrast to Delius' (1994) earlier definition of a same-different concept. His definition presupposes a purely categorical discrimination; it does not envision the kind of dimensional discrimination that we appear to have discovered in the behavior of pigeons, baboons, and humans. Mandler (2004) seems to believe that categorical samedifferent concepts are completely divorced from dimensional discriminations, even those involving abstract continua like variability. She criticized our work as epitomizing the problem of not distinguishing "perceptual from conceptual" accomplishments (p. 138). However, is this sharp schism between perceptual and conceptual behavior valid? Perhaps not. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) cogently argued that "completely modality-free concepts are rarely, if ever, used, even when representing abstract contents" (p. 232). The crux of their argument is that it is better to envisage any particular task as lying somewhere along a perceptual-conceptual continuum. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) proposed that many of the mechanisms that are often identified as conceptual have parallels in perceptual processes, suggesting that conceptual processes may be the result of perceptual processes becoming less bound to the perceptual specifics of the requisite stimuli. The degree to which a process is conceptual thus depends on the degree to which it is independent of the perceptual details. That is precisely why it is so essential to conduct transfer tests with novel stimuli, as we have routinely done in our experimental investigations.
Perceptual Versus Conceptual?
As we accumulated evidence that performance of our simultaneous same-different discrimination task is unaffected by certain perceptual manipulations (e.g., spatial organization, orientation of items, use of novel stimuli), we gained confidence that the task lies closer to the conceptual than to the perceptual end of the continuum. However, it would be foolhardy to claim that the discrimination is not at all perceptual. The pigeons, baboons, and people in our projects must have been able to extract valid visual information from the displays to choose the appropriate "same" or "different" report response in the first place and to have shown superior discrimination of the familiar training stimuli over the blurred and novel testing stimuli; otherwise, discrimination learning would have been impossible and neither form of stimulus generalization decrement would have been obtained. Indeed, strategic tests both during (Gibson & Wasserman, 2004; Wasserman et al., 2002) and after (Gibson & Wasserman, 2003) discrimination training disclosed that pigeons concurrently discriminate both concrete (individual item) and abstract (same-different relation) properties of visual arrays; these two properties even appear to be roughly equal in stimulus salience (Wasserman & Frank, 2007) .
Is Same Special?
A final project highlights many of the challenges that are posed by the same-different discrimination behavior of humans and animals. This project was inspired by the observation that the words same and different logically have disparate meanings in most languages; the idea of "sameness" is exclusive and narrow, whereas the idea of "differentness" is inclusive and broad (Cook & Wixted, 1997; Smith, Redford, Haas, Coutinho, & Couchman, 2008) . Why?
To find out, we (Young & Wasserman, 2002a , Experiment 1) assessed possible disparities in discrimination learning and stimulus control when people were trained on one of two tasks. In the "0 versus others" task, college students learned to discriminate 16-item same arrays (with an entropy of 0.00) from other 16-item arrays with higher levels of entropy ranging from 0.50 to 4.00. This discrimination coincided with students' possible predisposition to place displays with entropies greater than 0.00 into a single "different" category (Young & Wasserman, 2001a , Experiment 1). In the "4 versus others" task, students learned to discriminate different arrays (with an entropy of 4.00) from other 16-item arrays with lower levels of entropy ranging from 3.50 to 0.00. This discrimination conflicted with students' presumptive discriminative predisposition because it required them to distinguish among members of the broader "different" category.
If any special nature of uniformity merely reflects an easily learned response bias, then students should manifest similar rates of learning both discrimination tasks. However, if any special nature of uniformity is due to the operation of more basic psychological mechanisms, then students given the "0 versus others" task should learn more readily and exhibit a sharper distinction between the requisite discriminative categories than students given the "4 versus others" task. Precisely these latter results were obtained.
Students in the "0 versus others" condition discriminated quite accurately, averaging 89% correct during training, whereas students in the "4 versus others" condition had much more difficulty with their discrimination, averaging only 76% correct during training. Students in the "0 versus others" condition clearly distin-guished the entropy 0.00 displays from those displays with a higher entropy, showing equally high accuracy for all of those other displays. In contrast, students in the "4 versus others" condition often misclassified arrays with entropies near 4.00 as belonging to the entropy 4.00 category (Figure 16, top) .
Note that students in the "0 versus others" category were behaving in concert with their predicted predisposition to place displays with entropies higher than 0.00 into a single category, whereas students in the "4 versus others" category were working against this predisposition. Note also that Young and Wasserman (2001a, Experiment 1) earlier found that displays comprising intermediate levels of variability were more likely to be classified within the more inclusive "different" category than within the more exclusive "same" category. The relative breadths of the same and different categories were thus corroborated in the present experiment (cf. Smith et al., 2008) .
Given these results, one might suspect that pigeons and people should respond in highly divergent ways to different kinds of stimulus arrays, although at the most superficial level they each do discriminate same from different arrays containing a large number of items. To further explore this possibility, we (Young & Wasserman, 2002a , Experiment 2) gave pigeons the same two discrimination tasks that we had given college students (Young & Wasserman, 2002a , Experiment 1). If, for pigeons, there is nothing at all special about uniformity, then they should learn and perform both discrimination tasks identically. On the other hand, if there is indeed something special about uniformity, then pigeons given the "0 versus others" task should learn more readily and have a sharper distinction between the requisite categories than pigeons given the "4 versus others" task-just as our college students did in Experiment 1.
Surprisingly, the latter pattern of results was obtained. Pigeons in the "0 versus others" condition discriminated fairly well overall, averaging 70% correct during training, whereas pigeons in the "4 versus others" condition had much more difficulty with their discrimination, averaging only 47% correct during training (Figure 16, bottom) . Pigeons in both conditions showed the poorest performance for the "others" that had entropy scores near the boundary between categories, but this boundary effect was much larger for the "4 versus others" birds than for the "0 versus others" birds.
These findings with pigeons and people suggest that, for both species, there really is something special about uniformity that renders it saliently different from higher levels of entropy. What might that be?
Given the propensity for other (purely perceptual) dimensions to follow Weber's law (Weber, 1834 (Weber, /1996 , it is possible that equivalent disparities in variability or entropy may be more discriminable at the lower end of the scale (in which there is more homogeneity) and less discriminable at the upper end of the scale (in which there is more heterogeneity), thereby representing a logarithmic psychophysical relationship. Hence, the psychological distance between entropy 0.00 and 0.50 may be much greater than that between entropy 3.50 and 4.00. Just such a logarithmic relationship has been documented to hold for both humans (Young, Ellefson, & Wasserman, 2003) and pigeons (Young & Wasserman, 2002b) . So, according to this psychophysical analysis, same is special in the same way that the lowest value along continuous psychophysical dimensions is special (e.g., no length, no weight, no light; for our displays, no variability).
It is also possible that same is special for a very different reason. Odd items "pop out" from a background when they are distinctly different, which makes a display containing only one or two odd items distinctly different from one containing no odd items (e.g., Treisman & Souther, 1985) . The possible relationship between visual search processes and variability discrimination prompted the development of a new model of samedifferent behavior-the Finding Differences Model (Young et al., 2007) . We consider this model in greater detail in our concluding comments.
Again, Goldstone and Barsalou's (1998) analysis suggests how hazardous it may be to jump to conclusions as to the relative importance of perceptual and conceptual influences on behavior. Our proposal that same-different discrimination behavior is rooted in variability discrimination makes sense of a wide range of Figure 16 . Accuracy as a function of distance from the trained endpoint (0 in "0 vs. others" and 4 in "4 vs. others") in people (Experiment 1, top graph) and pigeons (Experiment 2, bottom graph) in Young and Wasserman (2002a) . From "Detecting Variety: What's so Special about Sameness?" by M. E. Young, and E. A. Wasserman (2002) , Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, p. 137 and p. 139. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission. empirical findings including this last one that might glibly be summarized by saying that same is special.
Concluding Comments
A funny thing happened on the way to our experimentally evaluating the conventional belief that only humans are capable of abstract thought: Pigeons solved an abstract cognitive problem, but in an entirely unexpected way. Given the task of making one arbitrary report response to arrays of identical pictures and making a second arbitrary report response to arrays of nonidentical pictures, pigeons did not categorize the stimuli into same versus different sets; instead, they dimensionalized the stimuli into low variability versus high variability sets. We made this surprising discovery when we showed the birds arrays that comprised mixtures of identical and nonidentical pictures. The pigeons exhibited a linearly increasing tendency to report "different" when we increased the percentage of nonidentical pictures; they did not categorically report "different" when any of the pictures were nonidentical.
An oddity of pigeons? No. Later research revealed that baboons behaved similarly. A peculiarity of nonhuman animals? No. Still more recent research divulged that a minority of college students also treated the task as a dimensional discrimination; indeed, even the majority of college students exhibited measurable sensitivity to visual display variability, particularly in their reaction time performance. These fascinating and unanticipated findings have forced us to dramatically change our research focus and to consider the possibility that the perception of variability is quite general across species and that it may be a substrate of abstract conceptual thinking (Wasserman, Young, & Cook, 2004) .
Of course, interpretive hazards await those who would impetuously conclude that similar behaviors imply identical processes or mechanisms. William James (1890) opined over a century ago that it is the bane of psychology to suppose that where the results are similar, processes must be the same. Psychologists are too apt to reason as geometers would, if the latter were to say that the diameter of a circle is the same thing as its semicircumference, because, forsooth, they terminate in the same two points. (p. 528) This warning is especially pertinent to those who study cognition from a comparative vantage point (Wasserman, 1993 (Wasserman, , 1997 Wasserman & Zentall, 2006) ; similar behaviors in different species may be the product of convergent evolution from similar selection pressures rather than the result of common ancestry. The qualitative and quantitative similarities between people and nonhuman animals that we documented in our experiments do not guarantee that all of these species deploy identical mechanisms to solve the programmed discriminations; but, it does suggest that many higher level cognitive accounts that we might be tempted to offer to explain human abstraction are not obligatory. Whatever mechanisms humans do use to perform these tasks could also be used by other animals. Humans, however, may possess additional cognitive machinery or leverage other experiences and skills (including language) to discriminate and respond to diverse stimulus arrays. Only further comparative study can divulge the actual processes operating in different species.
Different Methods
A further complication is the possibility that different experimental tasks may prompt organisms to deploy different mechanisms to solve them. Consider the same-different discriminative stimuli depicted in Figure 17 . Here, same displays entail all identical items, whereas different displays entail one odd item amid a majority of identical items. Pigeons concurrently given this socalled "oddity" task plus the so-called "entropy" task depicted in Figure 1 master both tasks, with little or no crosstalk between them (Gibson, Wasserman, & Cook, 2006, Experiment 2) . The absence of crosstalk may be surprising because the disparity in entropy between same and different displays in the oddity task is very small (0.00 vs. 0.34), whereas the disparity in entropy between same and different displays in the entropy task is very large (0.00 vs. 4.00). One might have suspected that quite different decision criteria would have been set to master each of these tasks if display variability alone were to control pigeons' behavior. Figure 17 . Examples of some of the arrays from the oddity task used in Experiment 2 of Gibson, Wasserman, and Cook (2006) . Even more challenging for an account based on entropy or variability are the results of a study by Cook, Katz, and Cavoto (1997) , who initially trained pigeons to discriminate same displays containing 6 copies (3 ϫ 2 array) of the same element from different displays containing 1 odd and 5 common elements. Following this training, the number of common elements in the oddity display was reduced, so that 2 ϫ 2 (1 odd and 3 common elements) and 3 ϫ 1 (1 odd and 2 common elements) displays were presented as testing trials. The amount of entropy in these oddity testing displays increased as the number of common elements was decreased. An entropy account would predict that accuracy should increase on different trials during these tests because the entropy in the oddity displays increased. However, correct responses actually decreased on trials with these modified different displays, suggesting that display entropy alone cannot account for these pigeons' testing behavior.
If pigeons are not using display entropy to solve the oddity task, then how do they successfully acquire this discrimination? Perhaps different training methods sensitize pigeons to different abstract stimulus features . Notice that the organization of the same displays is identical for both the entropy and oddity tasks (cf. Figures 1 & 17) ; these displays thus provide a common point of reference for both types of same-different discrimination. In contrast, the organizations of the entropydifferent and oddity-different displays are distinctly disparate (cf. Figures 1 & 17) ; this disparity may have led the birds to attend to different features of these displays while acquiring each of the same-different discriminations. Regardless of which features of the displays are controlling discriminative performance in the oddity task, it may be necessary to entertain the rather inelegant possibility that a multiprocess account will be needed to explain the performance of pigeons with the entropy and oddity tasks. We later consider this possibility in the context of a more comprehensive model of visual categorization as a function of abstract features.
Still other same-different discrimination tasks may call on alternative perceptual and cognitive mechanisms in their mastery and performance (Carter & Werner, 1978; Katz et al., 2007) . Consider the same-different discrimination task of Wright and his colleagues (Wright et al., 1983) . Here, two pictorial items are shown at different times in different locations: Stimulus 1 appears alone and, after the animal contacts it, Stimulus 2 is portrayed directly below Stimulus 1. If the two items match, then touching Stimulus 2 is followed by food; but, if the two items do not match, then touching a nearby nonpictorial stimulus is followed by food. With a sufficiently large pool of items in the training set, pigeons (given 256 items) and rhesus monkeys (given 128 items) attain high levels of discrimination accuracy and transfer performance despite the small disparity in entropy with only two items shown per trial (Katz et al., 2007) . Perhaps the combination of both successive and simultaneous opportunities to view and compare the pictorial stimuli on each trial contributes to the animals' notable success on this task. Or perhaps the symmetrical configuration of vertically presented items on same trials and the asymmetrical configuration of vertically presented items on different trials participates in these results.
The critical point here is that all same-different discrimination tasks may not be created equal. It will take a concerted effort to pinpoint the relevant procedural disparities and to elucidate how they contribute to any resulting behavioral divergences. The results of this work should provide important insights into how humans and animals process the many and complex stimulus relations that are present in the natural world.
A Different Explanation
After assessing the interpretive merits of entropy for samedifferent discrimination behavior, Young et al. (2007) further developed the notion of visual display variability with what they believe is an even more effective and less arbitrary formulation, the Finding Differences Model (FDM). Entropy proved to be highly successful as an account of discriminative performance because most of the stimulus sets that had been used involved items that either did or did not match one another. This new model is not so unrealistically constrained; degrees of difference are central to the FDM and they can be assessed through any measure of stimulus similarity. Thus, any manipulation that affects the similarity of the presented items-such as blurring (Young et al., 2007) or changing color -is predicted to affect discriminative performance.
The FDM proposes that display variability is captured by comparisons between or among the items in the display (Young et al., 2007) : The greater the number and degree of difference between or among the items, the greater the perceived variability or differentness of the display. Perceived variability was determined to be a synthesis of: (a) the number of items in the display, (b) the magnitude of the differences between or among the items in the display, and (c) the proximity of the items to one another. For example, a display with more items that are all nonidentical produces a larger difference score than a display with fewer items that are all nonidentical (or one with all identical items regardless of the number). A display comprising all nonidentical items that are quite unlike one another produces a larger difference score than one comprising nonidentical items that are quite similar to one another. Finally, nonidentical items that are widely separated from one another in space contribute less to the difference score than those that are spatially adjacent to one another; the proximity of identical items is irrelevant because the model only accumulates differences, not identities.
The precise weighting and mathematical integration of these factors was detailed by Young et al. (2007) . To measure the degree of difference between any items in the display, x and y, they used a version of the Minkowski metric:
where x and y were vectors of features, s i was the salience of feature i and d was the degree of difference between the vectors. When these difference scores were aggregated for an item and scaled by the Euclidean distance between the item and its neighbors, this produced an activation score for a particular item, x, in the display:
where l x and l y represent the spatial locations of items x and y, dist(l x , l y ) represents the Euclidean distance between these loca-tions, c represents the effect of spatial distance, N x represents the neighborhood of x (in their simulations, the neighborhood incorporated every item in the display other than x), and a x represents the activation of item x in the display (see Figure 18 for examples).
The mean activation score for the items in a display was then used to predict discrimination performance. The model did an excellent job of explaining those data that had proven to be problematic for entropy, especially the effects of blurring (Young et al., 2007) and Figure 18 . Activation maps from the Finding Differences Model (Young, Wasserman, & Ellefson, 2007) for three example arrays. Darker squares indicate that an item was more active (i.e., more different from its surrounding items). For a baseline of comparison, a different 4 ϫ 4 display would generate an entirely black map and a same 4 ϫ 4 display would generate an entirely white map. "A theory of variability discrimination: Finding differences," by M. E. Young, E. A. Wasserman, and M. R. Ellefson (2007) , Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, p. 810. Copyright 2007 by the Psychonomic Society. Reprinted with permission.
changing color on discrimination behavior.
Although there is utility in positing entropy as a characteristic of displays to which various species are sensitive, this supposition is silent as to the mechanism by which entropy is extracted. The calculation of entropy requires the categorization of the displayed items to determine the relatively probabilities of each item category (see Equation 1 ). This requirement proves to be problematic when the items vary continuously in similarity and thus are not categorically different (Wolfe, 1994; Young et al., 2007) . In addition, positing an entropy-specific mechanism lacks parsimony, whereas the FDM leverages a mechanism (differential item activation as a function of differences; Wolfe, 1994 ) that has proven utility for understanding the nature of visual search.
According to the activation map originally posited in the Guided Search 2.0 model (Wolfe, 1994) , items with high levels of activation in the map pop out from the background because they differ from nearby items and thus attract attention, as shown in the 15S/1D example in Figure 18 . Young et al. (2007) discovered that the average activation of the items in this map proved to be an excellent predictor of the categorization of visual collections based on their variability. So, for the 8S/8D array shown in Figure 18 , the average activation is much higher than for the 15S/1D array. Furthermore, the oddity task of Cook and colleagues (e.g., Cook, 2002; can readily be modeled using the activation map that is common to both Wolfe's Guided Search 2.0 and the FDM because an item is odd to the extent that it differs from the common items that surround it; thus, an odd item would have higher activation than the other items in a display. This oddness increases as more common items are added to the display because the odd item's differentness increases as the number of common items increases (i.e., the activation of the odd item increases per Equation 3). This phenomenon is clearly evident when comparing the activation maps for the 15S/1D and 3S/1D arrays of Figure 18 ; the odd item has much higher activation in the former case than in the latter.
Finally, two-item same-different categorization represents a special case because the concept of averaging the resultant activations becomes moot when both items have the same activations (A is as different from B as B is different from A). Furthermore, the distance between items is typically held constant (e.g., Katz et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2008) , thus reducing the distance adjustment of Equation 3 to a constant multiplier. Under these conditions, the FDM's predictions are perfectly correlated with the Minkowski distance between the display items. Using a two-item samedifferent task, Smith et al.'s recent observation that "same" is a narrower category than "different" for people, but not for rhesus monkeys rests on disparities in the best-fitting generalization gradients: primarily exponential for people, but Gaussian for monkeys. Both exponential and Gaussian gradients are themselves special cases of the general form of the Minkowski metric and thus fall well within the theoretical purview of the FDM. This possible species disparity in generalization gradients may be due to each species' ability to discriminate the visual items. Categorization of items that are easily discriminable tends to be best described by an exponential gradient, whereas categorization of items that are highly confusable tends to be best described by a Gaussian gradient (although the underlying gradient may still be exponential but appear Gaussian due to irreducible noise in the perceptual and memory systems, see Ennis, 1988; Shepard, 1986) .
Therefore, variability discrimination, two-item same-different discrimination, visual search, and oddity detection may all rely on extracting key information from a redescription of a collection of visual items in the form of an activation map; nevertheless, each task may sensitize the observer to different features of this abstract map. We propose that this redescription by the FDM may represent an important abstraction from the items that constitute the visual display. This abstraction of the visual display may represent a key step along the perceptual-conceptual continuum posited by Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) , an abstraction that may prove to be especially useful for describing and predicting the behavior of a range of species across a wealth of discrimination tasks, not only same-different discrimination.
Returning to the opening words of William James (1890), the sense of sameness may indeed be the very keel and backbone of our thinking as well as the most important of all the features of our mental structure. However, we may learn even more about this core psychological process from the comparative study of our many evolutionary kin. Such comparative study, guided by a principled theory like the FDM, may help to advance the development of truly general accounts of behavior and cognition.
